Approved For Release 2006/04/01 REA-RDP80M01066A001400190001-8

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY



WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

5 MAR 1973

TS-611/SC-2(USIB) Dr. James R. Schlesinger Director of Central Intelligence Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear Jim:

You will recall that, during our discussion in your office in February, you requested any ideas I might have for changes or improvements in the USIB. Following are some thoughts on the subject.

My personal observation of the USIB since August 1972 is that the Board does not really act as the senior national intelligence board in the sense of being a corporate body. Instead, it acts as a loose conglomerate of individuals representing disparate interests. Individuals rarely lend their judgment to issues before the Board unless the issue directly affects their individual interests or agency.

The USIB, composed as it is of the senior intelligence representatives of the various departments and agencies of the government, represents a broad hody of intelligence expertise and talent. In my view the entire weight of this expertise and talent should be brought to bear on the issues brought before the Board for consideration. Jack Deane informs me that this indeed was the case during the USIB meeting of 1 March when NIE 41-73 was considered.

Jack has also reported to me that during the Executive Session you outlined your plans for the DCI Staff. I applaud these efforts as described to me as it will be a great step forward in providing you a broad base of advice in the discharge of your DCI responsibilities. I want to assure you of my personal support in providing the high quality people you require and will encourage the military departments to do likewise to insure the success of this concept of staffing.

DIA Declassification/Release Instructions on File

DIA

DIASC-2 TSC NO. 73-33

Copy 2 of 5 Copies
Fage 1 of 2 Pages

TOP SECRET

TS# 203169-73 Copy # 2

MORI/CDF Pages 1&2

The presidential letter of 5 November 1971 directs that the DCI will assume the responsibility for chairing and staffing all intelligence community advisory boards and committees. This has been interpreted in the past to mean that the Chairmen will be CIA personnel. I recommend that the chairmen of the major USIB committees be selected from among the best qualified of USIB member agencies and made directly responsible to you as the DCI in the performance of this function.

Another aspect which should be reviewed is the interaction of the USIB and the IRAC. The USIB with its responsibilities for intelligence production and requirements must be aware of the actions of the IRAC regarding the intelligence budget and resource allocation. This is particularly urgent when considering intelligence R&D.

Currently there appears to be no comprehensive examination of intelligence deficiencies that might require an R&D effort. The government is spending per year on intelligence R&D projects, but each project seems to be treated as a separate entity with little or no attention to matters of mutual support or elimination of duplication. Presently, a large portion of R&D resources is being applied piecemeal to a wide spectrum of collection systems and to first phase processing of the raw data obtained, but very meager resources are being applied to the improvement of analytic techniques for intelligence production. Also, we need much more R&D effort on increasing productivity and on developing more effective management tedhniques and systems, an area to which private industry has applied large portions of its R&D budgets in the non-intelligence area.

Experience has shown that the USIB apparatus has in several instances been unable to produce a timely substantive output for Henry Kissinger, resulting in his staff providing him with what he needed. I have read the paper which your staff produced for him over the weekend of 24 February and definitely consider this a step in the right direction. Any manner in which the USIB or DCI staff can be more responsive is to be commended.

I hope these observations are useful to you. I will add to them if or as others occur to me.

Sincerely,

/s/ Vince

V. P. de POIX Vice Admiral, USN Director

2

TOP SECRET

25X1

	s detached from control CONTROL			ET FOR	TOP	SECRET	DOCUMENT			
DOCUME	NT DESCRIPTION							REGISTRY		
ource								CIA Control No.		
	DIA	TS# 20 Date Docume						203169-73	3109-73 nt Received	
	203169									
oc. Date	Mar. 73						Logged By	3/19/73 Logged By		
opy No. # umber of Page	5 2						ER/s			
umber of Attac										
fied Top Secre of CIA. Access	his form will be placed on it within the CIA and will re to Top Secret matter is lin Officers who receive and/o provided. Each individual of	emain attached nited to Top Sec	to the doc ret Contro ttacked To	ument unt i personnei n Secret n	and those	e individuals Il sign this f	whose official du	ties relate to the m period of custody is	atter. Top n the left-	
REFERRED TO	RECEI			RELEA				N BY		
Office	Signature	Date	Time	Date	Time		Signature	Office/Div.	Date	
ER			3/19/	193						
			-							
				-						
							J			
NOTICE OF D	ETACHMENT: When this for	rm is detached	from Top	Secret mat	terial it sh	all be comp	leted in the appro	opriate spaces below	w and trans-	
initted to Cen	DOWNGRADED			DESTROY	ED		DISPA	TCHED (OUTSIDE	CIA)	
TO		BY (Signature)					то			
By (Signature)		WITNE	Signature)			BY (Signature)				

AND DECLASSIFICATION